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Abstract
This article assesses the role and functions of UNHCR during 
its formative years and explores its agency, influence, and 
use of power in global refugee policy. During most of the 
Cold War, UNHCR’s first four high commissioners employed 
delegated authority and expertise on refugee law and pro-
tection, thereby convincing states of the Office’s usefulness 
to international stability and ensuring its survival, growth, 
and power. It concludes by arguing that the Office should 
use the lessons of this early period of its history to explore 
ways to exercise similar attributes today.
Résumé
Cet article établit le rôle et les fonctions du HCR durant ses 
années de formation et étudie son mandat, son influence 
et l’utilisation de son pouvoir dans le cadre de la politique 
mondiale relative aux réfugiés. Durant la plus grande partie 
de la guerre froide, les quatre premiers commissaires du HCR 
ont eu recours aux pouvoirs qui leur étaient délégués et à leur 
expertise en matière de loi sur les réfugiés et de protection 
des réfugiés. Ils sont ainsi arrivés à convaincre les états de la 
contribution apportée par le Bureau à la stabilité internatio-
nale, et à assurer ainsi sa survie, sa croissance et son pouvoir. 
L’article conclut en faisant valoir que le Bureau devrait se 
souvenir aujourd’hui des leçons tirées de son histoire pour 
explorer différentes manières exploiter ces mêmes qualités.
This article addresses the agency, influence, and power of UNHCR regarding the evolution of global refugee policy during the Office’s first twenty-eight years. 
This period coincided with the Cold War, a time of intense 
bipolar rivalry and a concentration of power among the 
United States and other Western governments. 
UNHCR lacks a close history of its past operations and evo-
lution. Much of the early history of UNHCR, particularly its 
role and activities in the formation of global refugee policy, 
its strategies and influence on policymaking, and its agency, 
influence, and power have been little appreciated. There is a 
need for strong institutional memory and for more analyses 
of early instances of UNHCR’s agency, strategies, and power in 
shaping refugee policy and responding to past early refugee 
crises in order to inform the present. 
International relations literature on global refugee policy 
has mostly adopted a statist perspective, which asserts that 
UNHCR, like all international organizations, lacks autonomy 
and is just a mechanism through which states act.1 Partly as a 
result of the influence of the realist paradigm in international 
relations theory, leadership in international organizations is 
not a broadly researched theme. The common perspective 
claims that UNHCR is totally dependent on donor states for 
funding its operations, and on host governments for per-
mission to initiate programs on their territory.2 Therefore 
the Office is in no position to challenge the policies of its 
funders and host governments, and merely acts as an instru-
ment of states. In fact, as the primary institution in refugee 
affairs, and as the world’s foremost authority on refugees and 
displaced persons, the Office has unique authority in the 
humanitarian field, which at times can be utilized as influ-
ence and even power in global refugee policy.3 UNHCR has 
demonstrated agency and influence over the years, has been 
a purposive, entrepreneurial, and strategic actor with inde-
pendent interests and capabilities, and has even exercised 
power, despite the resistance of prominent states,4 particu-
larly during UNHCR’s first twenty-eight years. 
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The Cold War and the Establishment of UNHCR
When UNHCR was established in December 1950, Europe was 
the principal area of refugee concern for Western states, as 
the Cold War intensified and new refugee flows moved from 
east to west. While there were major refugee movements in 
the Middle East and in South and East Asia at this time, the 
Euro-centric orientation of the UNHCR reflected the foreign 
policy priorities of the United States, the hegemonic power 
within NATO and the Western alliance. The US preoccupation 
with reconstruction and rehabilitation in Europe after the 
Second World War, and the rapidly developing Cold War with 
the Soviet Union critically affected the lens through which the 
United States viewed both its own refugee policy and UNHCR. 
UNHCR was created by Western governments in such a 
way that it would neither pose a threat to their sovereignty 
nor impose new financial obligations on them. States gave 
the Office a mandate to provide legal protection to refugees 
and to provide durable solutions, but no guarantee of funds 
to carry out material assistance programs for the refugees 
under its care. Having provided the bulk of funding to the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency and the 
International Refugee Organization during the Second 
World War, the United States sought to limit UNHCR to a 
protection role for refugees and was opposed to the Office 
providing material assistance to refugees. 
Most significantly, American leaders considered refugee 
policy simply too important to permit the United Nations 
to control. The most important aspects of American refugee 
policy were maintaining international attention devoted to 
refugees from communist countries, encouraging emigra-
tion from the Eastern Bloc, and minimizing international 
appeals for assistance funds to refugees. To this end, the 
United States sought to limit severely the operational scope 
and independence of UNHCR and instead created its own 
American-led refugee and migration organizations, thereby 
enabling Washington to select, support, and control the 
international organizations that best reflected its own for-
eign policy priorities.5 The US Escapee Program (USEP) and 
the Provisional Inter-Governmental Committee for the 
Movement of Migrants (which soon was renamed ICEM and 
is today IOM) were generously funded by the United States. 
ICEM was charged with acting as an operational organization 
with a broad mandate to facilitate international migration of 
surplus populations in Europe, including refugees.6 ICEM’s 
activities were initially perceived by UNHCR to directly com-
pete with and directly affect the Office’s ability to define an 
independent role for itself.7 
Despite these handicaps, by the mid-1950s UNHCR began 
to develop a working relationship with ICEM and other 
organizations and to exercise power and authority autono-
mously in ways unintended by states at UNHCR’s creation. 
To explain how this occurred, it is necessary to examine 
UNHCR’s approach to and implementation of policy in its 
early years and to underscore the importance of several insti-
tutional factors that made it possible for determined early 
high commissioners to guide and to shape the evolution of a 
strong and effective organization.
The organization’s historical mandate, its formal struc-
tures, the early competition it faced from other international 
agencies and institutions, and the internal processes and 
internal hierarchical decision-making of the Office itself—
all influenced the direction of UNHCR refugee policy during 
the nearly first three decades of its existence. 
First, UNHCR’s 1950 Statute and the 1951 UN Refugee Con-
vention formed the template for how UNHCR should func-
tion and how it should make global refugee policy. These 
instruments provided the Office with unparalleled moral 
authority and a monopoly on legal and protection issues 
regarding refugees. Most importantly, they also provided 
a legal basis for the Office’s expansion of activities and its 
claims to legitimacy for its new geographic scope of activi-
ties from the mid-1950s through the late 1970s. 
Second, UNHCR is an intergovernmental organization 
that was created by states to protect refugees and to provide 
durable solutions to their plight. UNHCR’s Statute placed a 
temporal limitation on the Office’s work by requiring that 
it could concern itself only with refugees who had fled 
their home countries before 1951. The Statute also made the 
UNHCR formally subject to the authority of the UN General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. By plac-
ing UNHCR under the authority of the UN General Assembly, 
states provided a legitimate mechanism for further growth 
of the Office’s mandate and activities. Throughout its his-
tory, particularly from the 1950s through most of the 1970s, 
UNHCR used General Assembly resolutions in flexible ways to 
define and expand its own competence, role, and autonomy 
in politically sensitive refugee situations. In particular, the 
General Assembly’s “Good Offices” Resolutions of the 1950s 
through the 1970s led the Office’s expansion into Africa and 
Asia.8 Later, during the era of Sadruddin Aga Khan, UNHCR 
would be delegated by the UN secretary-general to act as the 
UN lead agency for the coordination of international human-
itarian assistance, not only to refugees and displaced persons, 
but also to victims of human-made disasters. In the process, 
UNHCR—with the approval of the UN General Assembly and 
successive UN secretaries-general—developed an enormous 
agenda well beyond its original mandate, greatly expanded 
its overall functions and authority, and became an indispen-
sable and autonomous actor in many of the major political 
developments in the Global South. 
Third, the international humanitarian system, the refugee 
regime complex, and the humanitarian marketplace within 
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which UNHCR operates also affect the authority and freedom 
within which the Office frames its policies and programs. 
Despite early competition from US-led national and inter-
national refugee and migration agencies, by the mid-1950s 
UNHCR demonstrated to the United States and other states 
that it was the only international organization with the 
authority, operational capacity, and operational effectiveness 
to manage large-scale refugee protection and aid programs 
of geopolitical interest to the major powers. 
Lastly, UNHCR’s approach to policy is significantly influ-
enced by the hierarchical structure of the Office. The 1950 
Statute that established UNHCR invested all the authority of 
the Office in the person of the high commissioner. In inter-
state discussions at the time, UN Secretary General Trygve Lie 
argued that the high commissioner should “enjoy a special 
status within the UN” and should also “possess the degree of 
independence and prestige which would seem to be required 
for the effective performance of his functions.”9 Over the 
opposition of the United States, which sought to place UNHCR 
in the UN Secretariat and thereby control the selection of the 
high commissioner, the founding states decided to create an 
independent high commissioner directly responsible to the 
General Assembly. Since its inception, therefore, UNHCR has 
always been referred to as the High Commissioner’s Office, 
underlining the primary importance and independence of 
the person of the high commissioner in UNHCR’s central-
ized decision-making structure. Accordingly, this article is 
organized around the Office’s first four high commissioners.
From the beginning, UNHCRhas had a top-down hierar-
chical decision-making and policy implementation struc-
ture.10 Thus the history and policy and institutional direc-
tion and expansion of the Office and its mandate have been 
influenced and shaped by individual high commissioners 
and their senior staff. The influence of the first four high 
commissioners—Gerrit van Heuven Goedhart, Auguste 
Lindt, Felix Schnyder, and Sadruddin Aga Khan—on the 
formation of the Office’s early policies and achievements is 
particularly striking and is the focus of this article.
The First Two High Commissioners:  
Goedhart and Lindt
Despite initial restrictions, the first high commissioner, 
Gerrit van Heuven Goedhart, embarked on a strategy to 
lobby and to convince the United Sstates and other Western 
governments of UNHCR’s usefulness. In an attempt to foster 
cooperation rather than competition, UNHCR and ICEM ini-
tiated steps to coordinate their activities in order to avoid 
overlap and duplication.11 
At the same time, Goedhart made repeated efforts to 
reconfigure his Office into the leading global agency for refu-
gees. Prior to becoming high commissioner, Goedhart had 
served in leading positions at the UN. Using his influence 
to convince former UN colleagues of the indispensability of 
UNHCR, he secured UN General Assembly approval to inde-
pendently raise funds. A UN Refugee Emergency Fund and a 
generous grant from the Ford Foundation enabled the Office 
to involve itself for the first time in overseeing assistance to 
NGOs, UNHCR’s main operational partners, to promote the 
integration of refugees and long-term displaced persons 
(DPs) in Western Europe. Crucially, this funding also ena-
bled UNHCR to lead in responding to an early Cold War refu-
gee crisis in West Berlin in 1953, thereby demonstrating the 
Office’s usefulness to the major Western powers and raising 
the Office’s international profile. 
 These early successes legitimized the need for further 
UNHCR material assistance to refugees. In 1954, the General 
Assembly approved a four-year program for permanent 
solutions and emergency aid, as well as the creation of a 
United Nations Refugee Emergency Fund Executive Com-
mittee consisting of the representatives of twenty states, to 
oversee and direct the program. UNHCR soon demonstrated 
its ability to influence the policy activities of this committee 
through the Office’s monopoly on knowledge about refugee 
issues and law, hosting the Secretariat within the Office, and 
rotating its chair. In 1955, UNHCR was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize, which further raised the international stature 
and profile of the Office.
Having demonstrated its ability to be proactive in raising 
funds and to responding to early Cold War refugee crises, 
UNHCR consequently was called upon to respond to the 1956 
Hungarian refugee crisis. The UN designated UNHCR as the 
“lead agency” to direct the international emergency opera-
tion for Hungarian refugees and to coordinate the work of 
all voluntary agencies. The Office established a coordinating 
group, which included ICEM and the League of Red Cross 
Societies. In addition to overseeing the financing of inter-
national assistance to the refugees, UNHCR had to reconcile 
the priorities of the refugees, the countries of asylum and 
resettlement, as well as the large numbers of NGOs providing 
assistance to refugees.
In assuming this pivotal role, the second high commis-
sioner, Auguste Lindt, displayed considerable innovation to 
overcome the temporal restrictions contained in the Refugee 
Convention. UNHCR’s protection division maintained that 
the origins of the refugee crisis in Hungary could be traced 
to events before 1951. Lindt’s Office also used its delegated 
expert and moral authority to argue that refugees fleeing 
Hungary could be recognized on a prima facie basis, rather 
than through individualized refugee status determination. 
Moreover, UNHCR’s leading role in Hungary not only dem-
onstrated its primacy among international organizations 
in the global refugee regime but also its emerging policy 
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convergence with that of the United States and other West-
ern states. Perhaps most important for its future growth and 
expansion, UNHCR also demonstrated its entrepreneurial 
ability to use expert knowledge in refugee law and norms in 
flexible and creative ways to open up opportunities for the 
Office to respond to new refugee crises. This is also an early 
example of the Office’s ability to make a legal argument to 
justify a position the organization wanted to make for other 
reasons, in this case for further expansion of its activities.
The Hungarian operation demonstrated the important 
diplomatic role that the high commissioner could play in 
events at the centre of world politics. In the midst of the first 
major Cold War refugee crisis, the UNHCR played an essential 
mediating role between East and West, involving the repatri-
ation of nearly 10 per cent of the Hungarian refugees12—an 
operation that was extremely controversial and was initially 
strongly opposed by the United States. Lindt’s initiative is an 
early example of UNHCR exerting power within the global 
refuge regime to overcome the opposition of some of the 
world’s most powerful states.
Thus, largely on its own initiatives, UNHCR grew in just 
a few years from a strictly non-operational agency, with no 
authority to appeal for funds, into an institution with an 
emerging long-range program emphasizing not only pro-
tection but, increasingly, material assistance. In 1958, the 
present Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Program was established with twenty-five state members. 
This remarkable transition during a period of intense bipolar 
rivalry, when state interests were paramount, demonstrates 
that international organizations such as UNHCR frequently 
exhibit considerable autonomy, influence, and power in 
global refugee policy. 
The refugee crisis in Hungary generated widespread 
sympathy for refugees and underscored the vital role that 
NGOs and local communities around the world played in 
UNHCR resettlement and integration programs. In response 
to the Hungarian emergency, UNHCR laid the groundwork 
for future partnerships and coalitions with NGOs in the 
Global South. The crisis also increased public awareness of 
the plight of refugees beyond Hungary, but particularly of 
the tens of thousands of displaced persons from the Second 
World War who continued to languish in DP camps in West-
ern countries. Consequently, soon after the Hungarian crisis, 
a grassroots international campaign of NGOs, churches, and 
other public interest organizations emerged to draw atten-
tion to the plight of these and other refugees, raise funds on 
their behalf, and lobby the United Nations to declare a World 
Refugee Year.13 
Lindt immediately recognized the potential of this mass 
social movement to raise the profile of refugees, as well 
as to highlight the work of UNHCR worldwide. The high 
commissioner also recognized that this movement provided 
the Office the opportunity to engage in networking at local, 
national, and international levels, to reach new audiences, 
and to develop a stronger profile among the public. In addi-
tion, this initiative offered the opportunity to raise much-
needed funds for the Office’s operations, particularly in help-
ing to resolve the protracted problem of displaced persons. 
During World Refugee Year (1959–60), a transnational 
advocacy network of NGOs, churches, and prominent indi-
viduals that exchanged ideas and information in order to 
influence government policies towards refugees was estab-
lished.14 When World Refugee Year ended in 1960, more than 
half of the displaced persons in camps in Europe had been 
found permanent homes in a third country, and $8 million 
had been raised to clear the camps.15 While the DP problem 
in Europe was not fully resolved until the mid-1960s, wide-
spread social activism on behalf of refugees had galvanized 
public opinion and had raised the profile of both UNHCR and 
refugees on the global policy agenda. 
World Refugee Year also coincided with major changes 
in international politics. Decolonization and the emergence 
of new states in the developing world were beginning to cre-
ate massive new refugee problems. As early as the late 1950s, 
UNHCR under Lindt took initial steps to lay the groundwork 
for an expansion of its activities, from refugee crises in 
Europe to those in the developing world. This new approach 
was the “good offices” formula that involved the UN General 
Assembly granting UNHCR the authority to raise funds or to 
initiate assistance programs for refugees who did not come 
fully within its statutory definition but whose situation was 
of concern to the international community. It was applied in 
the first instance to enable UNHCR to raise funds for Chinese 
refugees in Hong Kong in the late 1950s, despite the strong 
opposition of the United Kingdom, the colonial power and 
one of the founding member states of UNHCR.
Even more significant to the Office’s expansion into the 
developing world was its response to the Algerian refugee 
crisis.16 In May 1957, Tunisia requested material assistance 
from UNHCR for the 85,000 Algerian refugees who had fled 
across the border during the previous two and a half years. 
This was the first occasion in which UNHCR emergency assis-
tance was requested in the developing world; thus it marked 
an important step in the development of the political condi-
tions under which the Office had to act and of the functions 
and activities it was permitted to perform. 
 However, the decision to offer assistance to Algerian 
refugees was politically difficult and engendered an intense 
debate within UNHCR about its future role in the develop-
ing world.17 Some of Lindt’s advisers felt that the Office 
should remain focused on finding solutions for the refugees 
caught in protracted exile in Europe. The high commissioner 
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disagreed and argued forcefully that the Tunisian request 
presented an opportunity for UNHCR to use the new inter-
national support and goodwill that the Office had earned in 
its response to the Hungarian refugee emergency to confirm 
its position as both the leading international refugee agency 
and as the only international organization able to adapt to 
new emergencies wherever they arose. Moreover, UNHCR’s 
decision to intervene in the Hungarian refugee emergency 
on the basis that all the Hungarians prima facie fell under 
UNHCR’s mandate and did not require individual screening 
had established a precedent for action that was difficult for 
the Office to ignore in the Algerian case. Lindt feared that 
UNHCR would be accused of discriminatory treatment if it 
neglected the Algerians, and he did not want to be perceived 
as the “High Commissioner for European refugees only.”18 
He maintained that UNHCR’s mandate as defined in its Stat-
ute was worldwide, and that his Office had responsibility for 
dealing “with completely different people and not only refu-
gees from communism.”19 He was concerned that to refuse 
assistance to Tunisia would estrange the organization from 
a growing bloc of developing nations and would weaken the 
more favourable attitude that the Soviet Bloc had recently 
adopted towards the agency.
The high commissioner had to overcome strong oppo-
sition not only from senior staff members within his own 
Office but also from France, the colonial power in Algeria, 
one of the Permanent 5 members of the UN Security Council 
and one of the founding states of UNHCR. The French gov-
ernment denied the authority of the Office to give assistance 
in this case, claiming that Algeria was an integral part of the 
state of France and that the eventual solution could only be 
the return to Algeria of the people who had taken refuge in 
Tunisia and Morocco. France also feared UNHCR involvement 
would internationalize the crisis, and major Western govern-
ments were unwilling to oppose the French.20 Through per-
sistent and courageous diplomacy Lindt overcame French 
resistance and is perhaps the clearest example of UNHCR’s 
exercise of power in its early history.
UNHCR’s action on behalf of Algerians signified a turning 
point in the Office’s geographical scope and functions and 
led to a period of global and further institutional growth for 
the Office. In 1959, the UN General Assembly freed UNHCR 
from the necessity of seeking further authorizations to assist 
each new refugee group by giving the Office the future right 
to determine which groups to assist under the Good Offices 
function without further consultation with the General 
Assembly.
Lindt’s assertive initiatives and entrepreneurship laid 
the groundwork for UNHCR expansion into the developing 
world in the 1960s. The high commissioner’s actions also 
underscored the Office’s determination to play a key role in 
steering policy discussions and the future agenda for global 
refugee policy. 
Expansion into Africa, Asia, and Beyond under 
Felix Schnyder and Sadruddin Aga Khan
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Cold War extended beyond 
Europe into parts of the Global South. Violent decoloniza-
tion, as well as post-independence civil strife and war in 
Africa, generated vast numbers of refugees and underscored 
the strategic importance of conflicts outside Europe. Both 
East and West vied for influence in Africa and Asia and, at 
the same time, tried to minimize the possibilities of their 
ideological and strategic opponents gaining political advan-
tage in these regions. Throughout the Global South, the 
United States and USSR competed to build up local allies and, 
through economic aid, political support, and weapons deliv-
eries, constructed a range of client regimes that included not 
only governments but also liberation movements.
The United States perceived refugee problems in devel-
oping countries as potential sources of instability that the 
Soviet Union could exploit for its own advantage in extend-
ing hegemony in parts of Africa and Asia. Consequently, 
Western governments, particularly the United States, came 
to perceive assistance to refugees as a central part of their 
foreign policy towards newly independent states, thus using 
foreign aid asa principal tool in this East-West struggle for 
influence.21 During this period, governments made little dis-
tinction between military aid, development assistance, and 
refugee relief aid. More importantly, because UNHCR was a 
donor-dependent organization, possessing no communist 
member states and being dominated by the West, there was 
little risk of multilateral refugee aid being used in ways unac-
ceptable to the principal donor governments. 
Western governments were willing politically and finan-
cially to support UNHCR’s operational expansion into the 
developing world, because international action on the refu-
gee issue was also now viewed as a way to deal with both 
a growing humanitarian issue and a potentially significant 
source of instability in the Global South. At the same time, 
the infusion of newly independent African and Asian mem-
ber states in the United Nations made it possible to pass 
further UN General Assembly resolutions that authorized 
UNHCR to assist a broad category of people displaced by 
conflict outside Europe. UNHCR capitalized on the changing 
composition of the UN General Assembly and used its influ-
ence with new member states to eventually further broaden 
the scope and substance of its mandate.
The United States saw considerable political advantage in 
working through UNHCR to assist African liberation move-
ments that might otherwise fall under Soviet and Communist 
Bloc influence. The United States also favoured channelling 
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the great majority of its assistance to African refugee groups 
through multilateral agencies such as UNHCR rather than 
bilaterally, because Washington sought to avoid causing 
tensions with the Portuguese colonial authorities and the 
South African government with whom it had close eco-
nomic and security ties.22 Thus, policy convergence between 
the UNHCR and the United States over refugee assistance in 
Africa helped pave the way for the Office’s expansion beyond 
Europe, beginning in the 1960s.
The increase of American support for UNHCR programs 
in Africa coincided with the reduction of American support 
for refugees in Europe during the early 1960s. With the con-
struction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, fewer numbers of Com-
munist Bloc refugees were able to flee to West Europe. Con-
sequently, the United States began to attach less importance 
to the problem of refugees in Europe and sharply cut back 
its financial support for two of UNHCR’s main institutional 
rivals, ICEM and the US Escapee Program. As a consequence, 
UNHCR not only enjoyed a monopoly on expertise but also 
had no significant operational rivals, thus increasing the 
Office’s basis to demonstrate influence and power within the 
global refugee regime. 
UNHCR’s shift during the 1960s and throughout the 1970s 
from a European organization to a global actor relied upon 
further proactive, entrepreneurial leadership. The two high 
commissioners during this period, Felix Schnyder and Sad-
ruddin Aga Khan, were both politically astute and antici-
pated that the traditional concepts and legal definitions that 
the Office had used in Europe would not apply in the less 
developed countries and took innovative steps to expand the 
Office’s global reach. Both men sought to identify opportu-
nities in the changing nature of world politics during this 
period that would justify a more formal global role for 
UNHCR. 
For Schnyder, national liberations struggles, decoloniza-
tion, post-colonial independence, and the rapid expansion 
of the UN system during this period offered such opportuni-
ties. As former Swiss ambassador to the UN in New York and 
as chairman of UNHCR’s Executive Committee under Lindt, 
Schynder had close personal relations with many delegates 
from the new African and Asian states at the UN General 
Assembly and recognized UNHCR’s potential to lead in influ-
encing the future direction of global refugee policy. 
The third high commissioner took initiatives to steer gov-
ernment discussions at the UNHCR General Assembly and 
within the Office’s Executive Committee towards a greater 
understanding of the challenges presented by refugee move-
ments in the Global South and the role that his Office could 
play in leading international responses. Schnyder made clear 
that he foresaw a shift in UNHCR’s focus away from programs 
involving European refugees to an emphasis on assistance to 
refugees in the developing world. Using his influence with 
the established powerful state members and with the new 
member states at the UN, the high commissioner won the 
support of governments to authorize a series of “good offices” 
resolutions to respond to new refugee emergencies and to 
undertake new tasks. In 1961, the UN General Assembly gave 
UNHCR the authority to assist “both refugees within the man-
date and those for whom he extends his good offices.” 
The distinction between “good offices” and mandate 
refugee operations was subsequently abandoned by the UN 
General Assembly in 1965, formally recognizing UNHCR’s 
competence to provide protection and permanent solutions 
to refugees within the UNHCR mandate and refugees covered 
by the high commissioner’s good offices. The UN General 
Assembly also acknowledged the universal character of the 
work of UNHCR by appointing for the first time five additional 
members—all from North and Sub-Saharan Africa—to the 
Office’s Executive Committee. 
By the mid-1960s, however, Schnyder questioned the con-
tinued utility of the good offices mechanism to address the 
rapidly expanding numbers of refugee situations in Africa 
and initiated a process to amend the geographic and tempo-
ral restrictions contained in the Refugee Convention.23 He 
promoted discussion within his Executive Committee and 
among legal experts and others from the epistemic commu-
nity that led to the framing and adoption of the 1967 Proto-
col to the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Protocol removed 
the Euro-centric bias of the refugee regime and created 
a definition of refugee applicable to a wider range of refu-
gee situations. Consequently, the Refugee Convention was 
brought into line with the universal scope of UNHCR’s Statute, 
leading the way for the further global expansion and flex-
ibility of UNHCR activities. This UNHCR initiative was broadly 
supported by states and is yet another example of UNHCR’s 
entrepreneurial role and its growing use of its agency and 
expertise during this period to enable the Office to exercise 
greater authority and expand its operational scope.
UNHCR under Sadruddin Aga Khan (who had been 
deputy high commissioner under Felix Schynder) initiated 
and capitalized on international political and humanitarian 
developments to progressively expand its scope and author-
ity in global refugee policy and world politics. 
In order to lay the legal groundwork for this expansion, 
the fourth high commissioner broadened his authority to 
assist a growing number of persons claiming to be refugees 
or in refugee-like situations through successive UN resolu-
tions. In southern Sudan, UNHCR, for the first time, assisted 
people who were internally displaced. In 1972, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly mentioned refugees and displaced persons 
side-by-side for the first time, and in 1975 and again in 1979 
requested the high commissioner to promote lasting and 
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speedy solutions for refugees and displaced persons “wher-
ever they occur.” Sadruddin interpreted these resolutions 
to mean that “the High Commissioner’s Office could take 
action on behalf of large groups of people who may not all 
conform to conventional definition of a refugee but are in a 
situation analogous to that of refugees.”24 
UNHCR’s assumption of the role of “focal point” for the 
UN’s humanitarian assistance efforts, which it first used in 
the 1971 East Pakistan crisis and later in South Sudan and 
Cyprus, became an acceptable international arrangement to 
coordinate the activities of the UN in a major humanitarian 
emergency when the technical and material needs would 
exceed the mandate of any one agency. This would be the 
first of many refugee crises in which successive UN secre-
taries-general would call upon UNHCR to act as the UN lead 
agency for the coordination of international humanitarian 
assistance not only to refugees but also to victims of human-
made disasters and in selected cases to internally displaced 
persons. 
Under Sadruddin, UNHCR not only acted as the focal 
point for large-scale UN relief efforts, but also opened UNHCR 
offices in Asia and Latin America and administered massive 
repatriation programs. In the process, the Office developed 
an enormous agenda and became an indispensable and 
autonomous actor in many of the major humanitarian and 
political developments in Africa and Asia.
During this time, UNHCR also increased its efforts to influ-
ence the attitudes and actions of new states in Africa and 
Asia towards refugees. The Office’s autonomy and authority 
derived from its status as the guardian of international refu-
gee norms and as the holder of specialized knowledge and 
expertise on refugee issues. Sadruddin realized that in order 
for his Office to have any impact on the world political arena 
it had to use the power of its expertise, ideas, strategies, and 
legitimacy to alter the international and value contexts in 
which states made policy. 
As high commissioner, Sadruddin sought to influence 
and shape state practices and to define what constituted 
acceptable and legitimate state behaviour in the treatment 
of refugees. The Office sought to convince states to define 
their national interests in ways compatible with refugee 
needs. UNHCR not only acted as a transmitter and monitor 
of refugee norms but also socialized new states to accept the 
promotion of refugee norms domestically as part of becom-
ing a member of the international community. The political 
leaders of most newly independent countries in Africa and 
most other regions cared about their international image 
and sought international legitimacy through cooperation 
with UNHCR. Consequently, through a mixture of persuasion 
and socialization, the Office acquired considerable legiti-
macy and authority in the eyes of most new states. 
At the same time, UNHCR experienced few of the kinds 
of asylum problems in the industrialized states that would 
confront the Office in later decades. Most governments 
acknowledged that the Office’s protection division enjoyed 
unrivalled specialized knowledge and expertise concerning 
refugee and asylum law and deferred to the Office’s authority 
on asylum policy. With the notable exception of a few states, 
the Office played an active role in the refugee determina-
tion procedures of several industrialized states and exerted 
a considerable influence over government decisions. Hence, 
UNHCR’s autonomy was enhanced, and most governments 
in Western Europe demonstrated a generally liberal attitude 
towards asylum seekers.
Sadruddin perceived his Office to be first among equals 
within the UN humanitarian agencies. The Office’s expansion 
under his tenure coincided with a period of institutional 
crisis within ICEM. By the early 1970s, ICEM no longer had 
large numbers of European refugees and migrants to transfer 
overseas. Most donor states no longer saw the need for new 
ICEM programs, and several withdrew their membership, 
thereby further strengthening UNHCR’s position within the 
international humanitarian system. 
Similarly during the 1970s, as UNHCR activity extended 
to relief programs involving both human-made and natural 
disasters, the Office directly competed with the operations of 
the newly established Office of the United Nations Disaster 
Relief Coordinator. UNHCR sought to maintain control over 
its operations regarding the large-scale disasters of the period 
and thereby greatly expanded the functions, size, and budget 
of his Office. By 1976, the UN Economic and Social Council 
confirmed UNHCR’s new coordinating function as an integral 
part of its enlarged competence when it requested the high 
commissioner “to continue its cooperation with govern-
ments, UN bodies, appropriate inter-governmental organi-
sations and voluntary agencies, to alleviate the suffering of 
all those of concern to his Office.”25 The same resolution 
identified persons of concern to be “refugee and displaced 
persons, victims of human-made disasters, requiring urgent 
humanitarian assistance.”
The exponential expansion of the Office’s activities dur-
ing the mid-1970s led to a substantial increase in the size of 
UNHCR staff, its working budget, and above all the amount 
of funds spent on assistance programs. Annual program 
expenditure, which amounted to $3–4 million in the early 
1960s to $8.3 million at the beginning of the 1970s, leapt to 
$69 million in 1975.26 In addition to its regular activities, the 
UNHCR also acted as coordinator or the focal point for UN-
wide humanitarian and development assistance programs, 
sometimes involving budgets in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars. Consequently, the UNHCR’s special operations budget 
in 1975 had grown thirty-fold since 1966 as it coordinated 
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massive repatriations and UN assistance programs through-
out the developing world. Big budgets reflected the inter-
national community’s confidence in the UNHCR’s ability to 
carry out refugee relief programs and to be the primary 
humanitarian actor in the global arena.
This remarkable growth in both the size and diversity of 
UNHCR policies and programs and in its ability to define and 
influence the shape of international refugee norms and prac-
tice during a period of global change and upheaval supports 
the view that international organizations such as UNHCR 
frequently exhibit considerable autonomy, influence, and in 
selective circumstances even power, and that states are not 
the only important actors in international relations. 
Lessons of History
UNHCR and states have been too quick to forget the remark-
able early history of the Office and have not recognized the 
need to revisit the period for guidance. This was a time when 
UNHCR was at its weakest in material power and capabilities. 
Yet this was a period when the Office exercised influence and 
even power in selective circumstances over states and other 
actors in the international system.
During the first half of UNHCR’s history, the Office dem-
onstrated the importance of a strong foundation of interna-
tional norms and of effective and innovative leadership and 
entrepreneurship from individual high commissioners. In 
navigating the Cold War and the period of decolonization 
and conflict in the developing world, UNHCR had confidence 
in its strategic purpose and was aware of the changing global 
political context as well as the particular impact of their 
decisions upon the Office’s response to displacement in the 
developing world.27 The Office was at its most successful 
when individual high commissioners and individual mem-
bers of staff played a leadership role and were encouraged to 
be creative in identifying solutions to particular problems. 
The role of individuals in UNHCR’s early history and the 
leadership provided from the Office’s first four high commis-
sioners were essential to its success and influence during this 
period. All of these leaders had a UN political background, 
which increased the likelihood that they would be successful, 
particularly since the Office relied on the support of the UN 
secretaries-general and the UN General Assembly to expand 
its operations and authority. This contrasted with the second 
half of UNHCR history when states largely appointed high 
commissioners who had been involved in state politics and 
who had little prior experience with the United Nations and 
UNHCR.
Goedhart had served as the Netherlands delegate to the 
fourth and fifth sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most 
significantly, he had chaired the Third Committee, which 
had overseen the creation of UNHCR. Goedhart was elected 
in 1950 by the UN General Assembly, despite strong opposi-
tion of the United States, who backed their own candidate, 
Donald Kingsley, the head of the IRO. A strong orator and 
persuasive public speaker, Goedhart was widely admired for 
his firm commitment to human rights and refugee causes.
Similarly, before becoming the second high commis-
sioner, Auguste Lindt had prior experience with the UN 
General Assembly in New York as Swiss ambassador. He was 
a personal friend of Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN secretary-
general, and on good terms with the US delegation. Having 
a strong personality and a determined approach to difficult 
problems, Lindt was a pragmatic and skilled diplomat who 
oversaw UNHCR’s initial expansion beyond Europe.
Like Lindt before him, Felix Schnyder had served as Swiss 
ambassador to the UN in New York at a time of transition 
at the organization with the rapid growth of new member 
states at the UN during a period of decolonization. The third 
high commissioner had close personal relations with many 
delegates from Africa. Schnyder chaired UNHCR’s Executive 
Committee under Lindt and therefore arrived at UNHCR with 
a firm understanding of both the organization and of global 
refugee policy.
Sadruddin Aga Khan had extensive prior experience of 
UNHCR before becoming the fourth high commissioner. Sad-
ruddin served previously as Schynder’s deputy high com-
missioner. As a leader in the Ismaeli community, Sadruddin 
had strong international connections and reflected the shift 
in UNHCR concern from Europe to the entire Global South 
at that time. As high commissioner, Sadruddin pursued a 
similar path of expansion of UNHCR’s global reach, as had 
his predecessors.
During this period of its history, the first four high com-
missioners exercised influence and even power on global 
refugee policy, not only through individual leadership but 
also the unrivalled moral authority granted to the Office 
by its monopoly on legal expertise. At the time UNHCR was 
created, the entire legal unit at the International Refugee 
Organization moved to UNHCR and formed the UNHCR legal 
protection bureau. Paul Weiss, Jacques Colmar, Michael 
Mousalli, and others had unmatched legal and moral exper-
tise on global refugee matters. States did not have this level of 
expertise and moral authority, and neither did ICEM, USEP, or 
other international and regional organizations. During the 
second half of UNHCR’s history, many states developed their 
own legal expertise and had their own networks to counter 
UNHCR and to create alternative policies.
The UNHCR was originally created as a small office of 33 
persons and expanded only incrementally over the next few 
decades.28 By 1953, the Office had 99 persons,29 and during 
the first two decades of its history the size of staff increased 
very gradually. From 1959 to 1972, the number of staff barely 
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increased from 242 to 322.30 As a small tight-knit group of 
UN professionals, UNHCR developed a strong institutional 
culture and identity through a system of informal mentoring 
of junior staff by UNHCR senior members. This contributed 
greatly to the overall effectiveness of the Office during this 
period. From the late 1970s on, however, UNHCR grew rapidly, 
and by 31 October 2016 the Office had 10,700 staff located 
in 128 countries, which made mentoring of individual staff 
impossible.31 
Drawing upon the insights of UNHCR’s past adaptation to 
regional and global changes during the first half of its history, 
this article underscores the importance of the Office con-
tinuing to be flexible and catalytic in an increasingly chang-
ing and complex global refugee environment. Throughout 
the past sixty-five years, the Office has had to reinterpret its 
role in global refugee policy. At each stage, UNHCR has faced 
the imperative of ensuring refugees’ access to protection 
and solutions, safeguarding its own organizational interests, 
and maintaining its relationship with states. In the future, 
the Office can draw important lessons from the protection-
focused, assertive, and strategic agenda of its early years. 
While the context may be different, the basic principles for 
success remain as relevant as ever. 
The Office today is confronted with a world radically 
changed from the one it first entered in the early 1950s and 
faces new and emerging challenges, including migration, 
urbanization, state failure and fragility, climate change, and 
redefining the protection and assistance environment in 
which it works. Institutionally it faces an increasingly dense 
global environment in which a range of other international 
and regional organizations potentially compete with UNHCR 
and enable states to bypass the Office in addressing their con-
cerns regarding asylum and migration. Politically, in both 
the Global North and Global South, populism, prejudice, 
and ethnic, religious, and political intolerance are on the rise. 
Xenophobia and fear, driven in part by hostility to migrants 
and refugees, are present in many former host countries and 
have been exacerbated by the growth and impact of social 
and political media. Protection and asylum space are dimin-
ishing, and UNHCR faces the challenge of how to reinvigorate 
states’ commitment to refugees and other displaced popula-
tions. In recent years, the emergence of a more fragmented 
international politics with several power centres has put 
new pressures on the previous international consensus of 
rules and norms governing state behaviour and the roles of 
international organizations. Countries such as India, China, 
Brazil, and a number of Arab countries have become more 
engaged in international development and humanitarian aid, 
while UNHCR continues to depend exclusively on voluntary 
rather than mandatory funding provided mostly by North 
American and European governments and Japan. 
In responding to these problems and developments, 
UNHCR can learn important lessons from its early history 
and develop the capacity to address these and future chal-
lenges by strengthening its capability to engage in new policy 
fields, building new partnerships within and beyond the UN 
system, and engaging strategically with the changing politi-
cal context within which it works.
A new UN high commissioner for refugees was appointed 
in 2016. Filippo Grandi has had long experience with the 
UN, in senior positions at UNHCR under Sadako Ogata in 
the 1990s and more recently as the head of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees. 
His recent appointment as the eleventh UNHCR high com-
missioner coincides with major new and protracted refugee 
crises in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. As in 
earlier decades of UNHCR history, the global response to the 
current refugee crises requires strong leadership from the 
high commissioner and the international community. As in 
earlier refugee crises, Grandi must frame the issues at stake 
for his Office, for concerned states and for the refugees and 
displaced people under his mandate, and devise mutually 
acceptable formulas and policies to resolve the many crises, 
broker the interests of key players in building support for 
these policies, and exercise leadership during the imple-
mentation of any future international policy. UNHCR will 
also require the strong political support of both the new UN 
secretary-general, Antonio Guterres, and Canada and other 
governments on UNHCR’s Executive Committee.
UNHCR’s early history highlights the fact that the Office 
was conceived to be adaptable and entrepreneurial and to 
evolve in changing circumstances. Over the past six and a 
half decades, UNHCR has constantly adapted the scope of its 
concern and of its activities, demonstrating that, far from 
being fixed, the Office’s mandate to provide protection and 
solutions for refugees can and should be interpreted within 
its historical and political context. During most of the first 
half of its history, adaptation was characterized by being pro-
tection-focused, assertive, and strategic. As the lead agency 
in refugee affairs and as the foremost expert on refugees and 
displaced persons, the Office exerted power and authority. 
UNHCR should face current new challenges by drawing con-
fidently on these lessons and strengths from its past.
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